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In many European countries, the deregulation of energy markets leading to the introduction of 
unbundling and  incentive regulation for  utilities firms has made the task of setting an 
adequate cost of equity more difficult. Firstly, Legal Unbundling led to the creation of many 
legally independent network operators that have to be regulated  separately, excluding the 
generation or sales activities of mother firms. Identifying adequate costs of capital is thereby 
complicated by the fact that only very few network operators are traded on stock exchanges. 
Secondly, the increased pressure through incentive regulation schemes has reinforced the 
importance of setting the equity return adequately. The approaches chosen by regulatory 
agencies  have  often been accompanied by heavy criticism  regarding  methodology  and 
empirical data sets used. In this context the question arises, how regulators set equity returns 
for network operators and whether the methodologies applied are in line with state-of-the-art 
capital market models.  
This paper therefore starts by providing an overview on empirical results, reviewing major 
published studies of betas and equity returns regarding utilities and network operators. This 
research helps to identify and discuss the most important drivers of capital costs which is an 
indispensable groundwork for determining adequate betas. Additionally, an overview of the 
current practice  of  regulatory  equity return setting  is  provided.  These results are then 
compared to an empirical analysis based on a recent data set with more than 20 network 
operators. Based on this data set  the required equity returns  according to  different 
methodologies  (CAPM, Fama-French-TFM, Ross-APT)  are computed.  This provides 
evidence that regulatory practice in Europe and Australia ignores the Fama-French-TFM or 
the APT, even though notably the Fama-French TFM shows the potential to provide improved 
estimates of required equity returns. The paper concludes by providing a suggestion on how to 
put the FF TFM into practice accounting for the size of non-stock listed network operators. 
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In many European countries, the deregulation of energy markets leading to the introduction of 
unbundling and incentive regulation for utilities firms has made the task of setting an 
adequate cost of equity more difficult. Firstly, Legal Unbundling has led to the creation of 
many legally independent network operators that have to be regulated separately, excluding 
the generation or sales activities of mother firms. Identifying adequate costs of capital is 
thereby complicated by the fact that  only very few network operators are traded on stock 
exchanges. Secondly, the increased pressure through incentive regulation schemes has 
reinforced the importance of setting the equity return adequately. The approaches regulatory 
agencies have taken have often been accompanied by heavy criticism regarding methodology 
and empirical data used. In this context the question arises, how regulators set equity returns 
for network operators and whether the methodologies applied are in line with state-of-the-art 
capital market models.. 
The standard model for determining capital costs still is the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). An application of 
the CAPM-concept  or comparable multi-factor concepts such as the  three-factor-model 
(TFM) presented in Fama and French (1992) or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) by Ross 
(1976) require stock data of comparable firms in order to compute the systematic risk(s) of a 
business.
1  The process of Unbundling has led to a legal separation between sales and 
generations activities on the one hand and network operations on the other hand each with 
own systematic  risk  profiles.  Facing the challenge of data availability regarding network 
operators, regulators have to decide some crucial points: Use the CAPM or use other 
valuation models including for instance size and distress risk? Include integrated companies 
in the company sample? Differentiate between branches (electricity or gas network operation) 
in setting returns? How to handle leverage?
2
These considerations are essential and tightly linked to the specific risks network operators 
face in opposition to the risk profile of integrated companies. Generation risks include the 
demand side, market prices and hedging activities (oil, coal, gas, CO
2) and the investment risk 
in a certain technology. Sales risk is mainly driven by demand level, competition intensity and 
procurement risks. Network operations as a natural monopoly are characterized by a different 
risk profile: The demand risk is fairly reduced to the lack of competition; however regulation 
does have  a major impact  on business risk.  In a price cap regime without adequate 
compensation mechanism, the network operator incurs a demand risk if demand temporarily 
decreases due to for instance a significant conjecture impact. In a revenue cap regime, this 
kind of systematic risk does not exist.  
  
One aim of this paper is to summarize major empirical results obtained by researchers with 
regard to the discussed questions.  Due to the fact that Unbundling is a more recent 
occurrence, results from studies based on data from integrated companies will also be taken 
into account if meaningful. Due to the focus on the discussion of risk factors, we will neglect 
some parts of the methodological discussion. Dobbs (2008) for instance states that one-point 
estimates are not adequate to set WACCs in a regulatory process. He thus presents a Monte 
Carlo-simulation based approach to compute a distribution for the WACC.  Literature on 
utilities’ cost of equity is vast: A branch of research is dedicated to computing utilities’ equity 
returns based on different methodological approaches. Some authors have been focusing on 
the question, how finance theory may be applied to regulation with regards to the problem of 
beta instability. A third branch of research has focused on the question, if and how regulation 
influences systematic risk. This research is based on a hypothesis by Peltzman (1976) who 
assumes that regulators buffer shocks and thus decrease systematic risk. One aim of this paper 
consequently is to give a more detailed overview of results obtained in the field of empirical 
                                                 
1  The three-factor-model (TFM) presented in Fama and French (1992) additionally incorporates  size and 
valuation effects. An alternative to the CAPM based on a fundamentally different approach is the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT) by Ross (1976). The expected return for a stock depends linearly on a set of factors that 
may for instance be macroeconomic such as interest yield, GDP growth or default risk premium. 
2  Leverage is an important driver of risk at a firm and industry-specific level. As the systematic risk beta can 
only be measured in its leveraged form (‘equity beta’), several techniques exist to unlever it obtaining an ‘asset 
beta’, cf. Pratt and Grabowski (2008, pp. 143-150). After unlevering, which results in excluding the capital 
structure risk, only the business risk is reflected in the asset beta. Therefore, in the following sections the 
influences on systematic risk will be measured using asset betas.  
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research, the focus being utilities in general and network operators in particular. As such, this 
paper shall serve as a hub to research papers and give numerous sources for practitioners and 
researchers. Secondly, this paper will present and discuss the most important drivers of equity 
returns. Thirdly, as data sources with regard to network operators are limited; this paper will 
show how regulators handle the equity cost and evaluate these approaches. Fourthly, this 
paper will present an application of different valuation models to a set of 20 network 
operators. As such it is the first paper comparing the effectiveness of different equity cost 
valuation models to a relatively large set of network operators.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The second section gives an overview of literature 
regarding  empirical evidence and  discusses  the range of results obtained  and the major 
explanatory factors. Section three presents an overview of the approach regulation authorities 
have taken in more than 20 mostly European countries. In section four, results of an own 
analysis  based on the CAPM,  the  Fama-French-Three-Factor-Model  and the APT  are 
presented. In section 5, an approach of how regulators may use a simplified TFM model with 
regard to non-listed firms is discussed. The last section concludes. 
1  Empirical Evidence about Utilities’ Cost of Capital 
This section is twofold: First, an overview over existing empirical evidence is given. Second, 
the main drivers of systematic risk are discussed in order to gain insights about the relevance 
of methodological choices for practical applications of the cost of capital models. 
1.1  Overview on Empirical Evidence 
Empirical work on equity cost of utilities is vast, with the first results already published in the 
1960s. Table 1 presents important empirical results obtained by various authors, mostly for 
integrated utilities as unbundling has gained major importance only during the last decade, e. 
g. with the unbundling standards set in the European Union  in the year 2003.  
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Table 1: Comparison of empirical studies’ results (interest rates computed to real values) 
Authors  Data  Years  Model  βa  βe  rm-rf  re-rf  rf  re 
Miller and Modigliani (1966)  63 US electric utilities  1954-1957  DGM  -  -  -  3.7%  0.8%  4.5% 
Litzenberger and Rao (1971)  78 US electric utilities  1960-1966  DGM  -  -  -  2.2%  0.0%  2.2% 
McDonald (1971)  102 US electric and gas utilities  1958-1969  DGM  -  -  -  2.5%  1.5%  3.9% 
Higgins (1974)  81 US electric utilities  1960-1968  DGM  -  -  -  2.9%  0.0%  2.9% 
Pettway (1978)  36 US electric utilities  1971-1976  CAPM  -  0.50  -  -  -  - 
Hagerman and Ratchford 
(1978) 
Value Line Investment Survey, 89 
utilities companies, questionnaires 
1975  CAPM  0.32  0.69  -  5.4%  -0.4%  5.0% 
Thompson (1979)  76 US electric utilities  1958-1976  DGM  -  -  -  7.6%  0.7%  8.2% 
Clarke (1980)  50 US electric utilities  1965-1974  CAPM  -  0.62  -  -  -  - 














Brigham et al. (1985)  Dow Jones Utilities  1966-1984   DGM  -  -  5.6%  5.1%  2.1%  7.1% 












Norton (1985)  CRSP, 21 regulated companies  1975  CAPM  -  0.63  -  -  -  - 
Fraser et al. (1986)  86 US electric utilities  1974-1983  CAPM  -  0.35  -  -  -  - 
Shome and Smith (1988)  96 US electric utilities  1971-1985  DGM  -  -  -  3.6%  2.1%  5.7% 
Golec (1990)  79 US electric utilities  1969-1983  CAPM  -  0.36  -  -  -  - 
Gombola and Kahl (1990)  61 US electric and 48 US gas utilities  1967-1981  CAPM  -  0.52  -  -  -  - 
Riddick (1993)  Electric and gas distribution utilities on 
CRSP tapes 
1965-1986  CAPM  -  0.53  -  -  -  - 
Elton et al. (1994)  NYSE, sample of 122 utilities  1978-1990  APT  -  -  -  6.0%  2.6%  8.6% 
Alexander et al. (1996)  Utilities from more than 15 countries  1990-1995  CAPM  0.50  -  -  -  -  - 












Cooper and Currie (1999)  LBSRMS, seven water companies  1994-1999  CAPM  0.57  0.72  9.2%  6.6%  2.8%  9.4% 
Buckland and Fraser (2001)  LSE, 10 UK water companies  1989-1999  CAPM  0.60  0.76  -  -  -  - 
Cragg et al. (2001)  US and UK electric, gas and pipeline 
companies 














Miller and Zhang (2003)  S&P IFCG China Index, 12 electric and 
3 water utilities 
1993-2002  CAPM  -  0.97  7.9%  7.7%  2.0%  9.7% 
Gerke (2003)  14 German utilities in CDAX utilities 

















Gray and Officer (2004)  Energy Distribution and Retailing GICS   1994-2004  CAPM  -  1.02  -  -  -  - 
Lally (2005)  64 US electric and 29 US gas utilities  1999-2003  CAPM  0.30  0.75  -  -  -  - 
Rocha et al. (2007)  Value Line Investment Survey  1998-2005  CAPM  0.41  -  6.9%  5.2%  2.8%  8.0% 
Frontier Economics (2008)  11 integrated utilities companies,  
12 network operators 
2006-2007  CAPM  0.39  0.79  3.0%  6.6%  3.0%  6.6% 
Kema Consulting (2008)  6 European electricity network operator 

















PwC (2009)  7 integrated utilities companies,  
11 network operators 
2004-2009  CAPM  -  0.90  5.0%  4.5%  2.5%  7.0% 
Some adaptations were required to enhance comparability. All nominal values were adjusted for inflation using data from the US Federal 
Reserve. If the risk-free rate was not published in the paper, T-Bill 3 months average for the analyzed period was taken as proxy. For the 
later publications regarding Europe and South America, such modifications were not necessary as real values were published. A table with 
all modifications is available upon request. 
 
Unfortunately, empirical research on required equity returns regarding specifically network 
operators is scarce with only four studies, the oldest dating from 2004 (Gray and Officer). In 
earlier studies, authors have often referred to the equity beta while the more recent research 
focuses on asset betas in order to differentiate between business risks and risks due to the 




1.2  Drivers of Estimated Equity Returns 
In this section, reasons for the obtained differences are discussed. The aim of this work is to 
identify the relevance of various methodological choices for the empirical results obtained. 
This is crucial for helping regulators and network operators to apply adequate cost of capital 
concepts  
Valuation Models 
The choice of the cost of equity model has considerable impact. Thompson (1979) discusses 
the important differences obtained with various dividend growth models notably taken from 
papers by Miller and Modigliani (1966), McDonald (1971), Litzenberger and Rao (1972) and 
Higgins (1974). A more recent discussion concerns differences obtained with CAPM and 
APT on identical data sets. Bower et al. (1984) claim that regulatory authorities should not 
use the single-factor CAPM-approach but refer to the APT-approach. Conine and Tamarkin 
(1985) find that using a three-moment CAPM leads to significantly higher capital cost 
estimates than using the standard CAPM. Elton et al. (1994) find that the difference between 
valuations based on either CAPM or APT is significant. In another empirical research, Fama 
and French (1997) find that a difference of about 2% between CAPM and TFM is common. 
Cragg et al. (2001) find differences of more than 5%. 
 Yet no published empirical research has so far focused on the impact of valuation models in 
the case of  network operators. Section 4 will therefore analyze whether  the choice of 
valuation model has a significant impact on required returns for network industries.  
Activities in the value chain: Network operator vs. integrated utility company 
Betas reflect systematic risk. Consequently, integrated utilities should be characterized by 
different betas than pure distribution or transmission network operators. Unfortunately, most 
empirical evidence has been founded on data of integrated US electric companies. One 
interesting first step is consequently to compare pure (either transmission or distribution, or 
mixed)  network companies with  integrated companies.  We identified four  studies that 
permitted to separate results with regard to the value chain.  
 
Table 2: Differences in beta by value chain activity 












Gray and Officer (2004)  0.87  0.65  0.22  0.45  0.36  0.09 
Frontier Economics (2008)  -  -  -  0.50  0.39  0.11 
Kema Consulting (2008)  0.68  0.61  0.07  0.43  0.37  0.06 
PwC (2009)  -  -  -  0,38  0,34  0,04 
Mean values  0.74  0.63  0.15  0.44  0.37  0.08 
 
Frontier Economics (2008) conclude  that risks are significantly different for network 
operators as compared to integrated utilities firms. Table 2 supports this assumption; one can 
see that betas of integrated utilities are higher than network operator betas. In the available 
studies, no significant evidence can be found for  a difference between pure distribution 
network operators, pure transmission network operators and mixed forms. One may thus 
conclude that often liberalized generation and retail activities are characterized by higher 
systematic risks than the regulated network business.  
Branch: Electricity, gas and water 
Table 3 shows beta differences found in studies related to branches. Systematic risks might 
differ to the lack of generation price risk (water), a more important dependence on economic 
cycles (electricity demand, price of raw materials such as oil and coal) and transportation risk 
(gas). These differences are only to very minor degree network specific.
3
 
 However, results are 
ambiguous and do not clearly lead to a conclusion that a differentiation between the branches 
electricity and gas is mandatory. A comparison with water betas is problematic, due to the fact 
that only two papers were published using UK-data. 
                                                 
3 One possible exception is the competition on the demand side between oil and gas heating leading to additional 
systematic risk. Another may be that gas demand is more volatile to temperature than electricity.  
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Table 3: Differences in beta by branch  






Alexander et al. (1996)  0.56  0.51  0.46 
Gray and Officer (2004)  0.59  0.59  - 
Lally (2005)  0.27  0.22  - 
Frontier Economics (2008)  0.45  0.42  - 
Kema Consulting (2008)  0.37  0.41  - 
PwC (2009)  0.41  0.33  0.31 
Mean values  0.44  0.41  0.39 
 
Frontier Economics (2008) describe beta differences between electricity and gas utilities of 
0.03  comparable to the mean values indicated in Table 4, but find, testing for statistical 
effects, that differences are insignificant. 
Regulation scheme and regulatory events 
One further question of interest is, if regulation itself will increase or decrease systematic risk. 
The discussion is based on Peltzman’s hypothesis (1976) that regulators will buffer shocks. 
Norton (1985) and Alexander et al. (1996) provide evidence that more regulation will lead to 
a lower systematic risk.
4 In the recent environment of many network operators, characterized 
by unbundling and incentive regulation, it is unclear if this effect still exists in practice. 
Rammerstorfer (2009) analytically discusses the link between regulatory regime and the 
systematic risk.
5
The regulatory risk for network operators under incentive regulation, such as the non-
acceptance of the regulated asset base, stranded investments and effects of network size and 
age structure are specific to firms and as such not represented in beta.
 
6
Default and distress risk (firm size, book-to-market ratio) 
 Consequently, Frontier 
Economics (2008) find that average asset beta for a network operator under  incentive 
regulation is not significantly different compared to the value of an operator under a cost of 
service regulation. From these results, different conclusions are possible: Either no real 
differences exist or these differences are dominated by other effects, such as the rigor of the 
regulation authority, which obviously  may be more important than the regulation regime 
itself.  
Banz (1981), Fama and French (1995)  and others  observed  that  required equity cost  is 
negatively related to firm size in a systematic way. This may be due to the fact that smaller 
companies are in general more risky, as bankruptcy is more costly for smaller than for bigger 
firms, cf. for instance Warner (1977).  In a later article, Fama and French (1997) compute 
equity costs for different industries with interesting though irritating findings. Their three-
factor-model indicates important negative signs for the size parameter for energy, utilities and 
telecom companies while the mean value over all industries is positive. This means that from 
a cross-industry perspective, smaller firms have higher required equity returns than bigger 
firms but that somehow for some regulated businesses, this effect is reversed.
7
                                                 
4 Norton (1985) analyzes the impact of regulation on beta estimates, regulation being characterized by breadth of 
authority conferred by statues, commission staff and budget size and judicial decisions. He finds that the equity 
beta of strongly regulated utility firms is about 0.12 lower than that of unregulated firms. Alexander et al. 
(1996) present 1991 to 1995 data for a large number of companies and countries, discussing the link between 
the regulatory scheme and systematic risk. For the impact of incentive schemes, they find that low powered 
ones imply average betas around 0.31, intermediate 0.60 and high powered 0.71. A high-powered incentive 
scheme can be characterized by few regulatory interventions (apart from setting the frame). 
 Further, they 
5 She finds that price-cap regulation leads to higher systematic risk than incentive regulation or no regulation. 
The interesting comparison to rate-of-return regulation is unfortunately not discussed. 
6 Cf. Evans and Guthrie (2005) for a discussion of the link between different concepts for the regulatory asset 
base and the existence of specific risk due to demand fluctuations when investments are irreversible and 
Schober et al. (2011) for an analysis of idiosyncratic risks due to the network structure. 
7 These points are one major criticism towards empirically-focused models namely the lack of explanatory 
theory. The results may for instance be explained by regulatory interventions. Regulation authorities can be 
suspected to investigate bigger firms more intensely than smaller firms. Nwaeze (2000) observes that the 
increase of risk related to regulatory events is higher for bigger firms.  
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identified a positive relationship between the book-to-market-ratio of equity value and the 
required return. This means that firms with a relatively low market value of equity suffer of a 
distress risk due to poor earnings prospects and thus have higher costs of equity.  
 
2  Regulators’ Approach to Risk and the Cost of Equity 
The overview on empirical research in the previous section has provided ample evidence that 
methodological choices have a  considerable impact on the computed costs of capital. 
Therefore it is now interesting to investigate to what extent the various methodological 
choices are reflected in regulatory practice.  
Over the past decade, many European regulation authorities have derived equity returns to be 
used when computing the cost of equity. This work offers ample evidence how regulation 
authorities value the cost of equity which can be interpreted as a proxy for required equity 
return. So far the question of how regulators set allowed equity return has not been intensely 
researched. Therefore research has been conducted on more than 20 regulation schemes.  
Table 4 summarizes the key findings on the identified regulatory approaches. All values given 
are nominal return rates (unless  regulators set inflation-adjusted  real values) in order to 
adequately capture actual regimes.  Besides the numbers, this analysis provides further 
interesting insights into the regulatory process of defining the adequate return on equity. 
 
Table 4: Regulators’ approaches to network cost of capital  












Australia  AER (2009)  2009-14  0.80  0.39  Nom.  6.5%  5.7%  10.9% 15.5%  0.60  7.5%  10.7%  7.5%  8.8% 
Austria  E-Control (2009)  2010-13  0.69  0.33  Nom.  5.0%  4.2%  7.6%  10.1%  0.60  5.0%  7.0%  5.3%  6.0% 
Belgium  CREG (2008)  2007  0.88  0.38  Nom.  2.5%  3.8%  7.2%  11.0%  0.67  4.5%  6.6%  4.4%  5.4% 
Czech Rep.  ERO (2009)  2010-14  0.54  0.35  Nom.  6.4%  4.6%  8.0%  9.9%  0.40  4.9%  7.9%  6.4%  6.8% 
Estonia  ECA (2010)  2010  0.74  0.34  Nom.  5.0%  5.5%  9.2%  9.2%  0.50  6.3%  7.8%  7.8%  7.8% 
France  CRE (2009)  2010  0.66  0.33  Nom.  4.5%  4.2%  7.2%  10.9%  0.60  4.8%  7.3%  4.8%  5.7% 
Finland  EMA (2007)  2008-11  0.40  0.30  Nom.  5.0%  3.8%  6.0%  7.4%  0.30  4.4%  6.5%  5.2%  5.5% 
Germany  BNetzA (2008)  2009-13  0.79  0.40  Nom.  4.6%  4.2%  7.8%  9.3%  0.60         
Hungary  HEO (2009)  2009-12  0.43  0.26  Real  5.9%  4.6%  7.1%  8.9%  0.57  6.4%  7.5%  6.0%  6.7% 
Ireland  CER (2005)  2006-10  0.80  0.40  Real  5.3%  2.4%  6.6%  0.08  0.50  3.7%  5.6%  4.9%  5.2% 
Italy  AEEG (2008)  2008-11  0.60  0.33  Nom.  4.0%  4.5%  6.9%  8.6%  0.50  5.4%  7.0%  5.6%  6.1% 
Kosovo  ERO (2006)  2006-10  0.90  0.41  Real  5.5%  5.5%  11.8%  14.7%  0.60  8.2%  10.8%  8.6%  9.6% 
Luxembourg  ILR (2008)  2009  0.80  0.39  Nom.  4.6%  4.4%  8.0%  11.5%  0.60  5.2%  7.7%  5.4%  6.3% 
Netherlands  Oxera (2009)  2010-  0.83  0.30  Nom.  5.0%  4.1%  8.2%  11.7%  0.60  5.3%  7.9%  5.5%  6.5% 
New Zealand  Co. Com. (2010)  2009-13  0.75  0.35  Nom.  7.5%  5.4%  9.4%  13.4%  0.60  7.4%  9.8%  6.8%  8.2% 
Norway  Mail document   2007-11  0.88  0.35  Nom.  4.0%  3.3%  6.8%  9.4%  0.60         
Portugal  Mail document  2009-12  0.91  0.61  Nom.  4.0%  4.4%  8.0%  10.9%  0.61  5.1%  7.4%  5.4%  6.2% 
Spain  CNE (2007)  2009-  0.57  0.35  Nom.  5.5%  4.4%  7.6%  10.8%  0.37  5.1%  8.7%  6.1%  6.7% 
Sweden  Icecapital (2009)   2008-11  0.63  0.48  Nom.  4.9%  3.8%  7.9%  11.0%  0.29  4.8%  9.2%  6.6%  7.0% 
Switzerland  UVEK (2010)  2010  0.88  0.35  Nom.  5.0%  3.0%  7.4%  9.3%  0.60  2.5%  5.2%  4.2%  4.5% 
UK  OFGEM (2009)  2010-15  0.97  0.34  Real  4.0%  2.8%  6.7%  9.3%  0.65  3.6%  5.6%  4.0%  4.7% 
Bold printed values are indicated as major results in the sources. Data were mostly directly provided by regulation authorities, indications for 
sources are given in Appendix A. Some further remarks are necessary: In Estonia, pre- and post-tax values are equal due to a special tax 
regime. Ireland values were based upon the approach for transmission operators. Kosovo considers an additional size premium of 1.5%. New 
Zealand uses a special form of the CAPM, the Lally-CAPM in which the market risk premium is corrected for taxes. 
 
The numerical results differ significantly, the risk premium varying between 3% (Belgium) 
and 7.5% (New Zealand) and the  asset beta ranging from 0.26 (Hungary) up to 0.61 
(Portugal).  These  market risk premia  and betas all reflect  the regulation authorities’ 
expectations for a comparable time span (2007 up to 2014) rather than concrete empirical 
findings. Therefore some aggregated results are presented in Table 5.   
7 
 
Table  5:  Summary of results, average value per regional subsample and corresponding standard 
deviation (in parentheses) 
Subsample  βa  rm-rf  Gearing  ru-rf 
Western Europe  0.35 (0.03)  4.5% (0.5%)  0.57 (0.08)  3.6% (0.6%) 
Eastern Europe  0.34 (0.06)  5.7% (2.0%)  0.52 (0.09)  4.0% (1.6%) 
Scandinavia  0.38 (0.09)  4.6% (1.0%)  0.40 (0.18)  3.3% (1.0%) 
Austr. & New Zeal.  0.37 (0.03)  7.0% (1.1%)  0.60 (0.0)  4.6% (0.8%) 
World  0.37 (0.07)  5.0% (1.1%)  0.54 (0.11)  3.7% (0.9%) 
 
Considering all approaches analyzed in the context of this study, some patterns become 
visible. Firstly, the average asset beta corresponds to 0.37 with a standard deviation of 0.07 
(cf. Table 5). Secondly, Western Europe regulators use homogenous approaches to set the 
network operation equity premium: The standard deviation amounts to only 0.6% for the 13 
Western European countries. Thirdly, regulators often use lower values for the market risk 
premium than the values historically observed. Brigham et al. (1985) and Dimson et al. (2003) 
claim that expected risk premiums should be used rather than historical data,  the latter 
estimating a forward-looking arithmetic mean risk premium at about 5% for a world series. 
The arithmetic mean equity risk premium for network operators corresponds to 5.0% with a 
standard deviation 1.1%. With regard to the weighted average cost of capital, approaches to 
gearing, i.e. the ratios of debt to total capital, vary significantly between countries: the range 
is 0.3 to 0.7 with an average of 0.54 and a standard deviation of 0.11. The Western European 
group again is relatively homogenous with an average of 0.57 and a standard deviation of 
0.08. 
Concerning methodological choices, five aspects are worth noticing. Firstly and foremost, all 
regulators  considered  use single-moment CAPMs. The only regulation authority that 
considered a DGM to validate CAPM-results was OFGEM.  The impact of this 
methodological choice will be investigated in detail in the following section. Secondly, only 
Kosovo adopted a size risk premium of 1.3%, but not based on the Fama and French (1995) 
approach. The results are thus comparable to the results of Besley and Bolton (1994) who find 
that US regulation authorities have not considered the size effect in rate setting. Thirdly, 
practically all regulators that computed ‘proper’ betas in the process considered data from 
integrated utilities that include activities such as generation and wholesale. Fourthly, many 
regulators computed separate betas for electricity and gas, which is probably due to the 
existence of large (vertically integrated) companies with a focus on either electricity or gas 
such as Scottish Power, Endesa, Gaz de France etc., which are listed in stock exchanges. 
Fifthly, many regulators modify beta values after a regulation period has been terminated. As 
such, they are in line with the proposition of section 2 that regulatory events modify the 
systematic risk.  
3  Comparison of Valuation Approaches for Network Operators 
The aim of this section is to investigate whether the choice of regulators to use only CAPM is 
well-founded. Therefore besides the classic CAPM, a TFM (comparable to Fama and French) 
and an Arbitrage Pricing Model with pre-specified factors based on Chen, Ross and Roll 
(1986) are fitted to a portfolio of more than 20 network operators.
8
                                                 
8 The models will be abbreviated with FF-TFM and CRR-APT in the following chapter. The following network 
operators were included: APA Group, DUET Group, Envestra, Spark Infrastructure, SP AusNet (all Australia); 
Elia, Snam Rete Gas, Terna, Enagas, Red Electrica, National Grid (all Europe); AGL Resources, Atmos 
Energy, ITC Holding, Kinder Morgen Energy P., Jersey Resources Nicor Inc, Northwest Natural Gas, 
Piedmont Natural Gas, TC Pipelines, WGL Holding Inc (all US) 
 As shown in the previous 
sections, the calculus of network operators’ capital costs should not be based on the stock data 
of integrated utilities companies. Unfortunately most network operators worldwide, even with 
unbundling requirements in place for instance in the European Union, are part of 
conglomerates or even nationalized and thus not listed on stock exchanges. This directly leads 
to a relative heterogeneous set of network operators that have to be used to compute market-
based capital costs, but it is the only market-data based driven approach to identify risk 
premia for network operation.  
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Results for the CAPM 
The first part of the analysis consists in computing CAPM betas via a time series regression 
using monthly data from 2000 up to 2010 and equally weighted portfolios.
9 The network 
operators are regrouped into the Portfolios ‘US NetOp’, ‘Europe NetOp’ and ‘Australia 




  The Dow Jones Utilities, the Euro Stoxx Utilities and ASX 200 Energy are 
included in the analysis to represent benchmark portfolios including mostly integrated utilities 
companies. Overall regression quality is average to low with regression coefficients mostly 
below 0.3.  
Table 6: CAPM factors 
Portfolio  βe  t-statistic  R
2 
Australia - NetOp  0.40  5.2
***  0.19 
Australia - Integr  0.51  4.4
***  0.14 
Europe - NetOp  0.30  5.1
***  0.18 
Europe - Integr  0.58  6.2
***  0.24 
US - NetOp  0.39  5.3
***  0.19 
US - Integr  0.76  6.3
***  0.25 
World - NetOp  0.34  7.4
***  0.32 
*** significant at 99%, 
** at 95% and 
* at 90% 
All betas are significantly different from zero with t-statistics above 4. Further tests were 
conducted in order to check if the activity in the value chain (transmission or distribution) and 
the product (electricity, gas) matters  concerning beta. The results showed only minor 
differences, none of them significant. The different risk profiles of integrated utilities and 
network operators are obvious and significant, integrated companies being characterized by 
higher systematic risk. 
 
Results for the FF-TFM 
In  the  second part of the analysis,  betas for a TFM  are  computed with a similar 
parameterization as the CAPM (portfolios, monthly data, etc.). SMB data are derived from 
monthly return differences between MSCI All-World Big Cap and MSCI All-World Small 
Cap (World), Dow Jones Industrial and S&P 600 Small Cap (US), Euro Stoxx 50 and Euro 
Stoxx Small (Europe), S&P/ASX 20 and S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries (Australia). HML data 




   
 
                                                 
9 The approach of equally-weighting the portfolio elements is often used in empirical work such as Blume (1975) 
and Banz (1981). This is in line with Frankfurter and Vertes (1990) who find that value-weighted portfolios are 
biased downwards in risk, even for large portfolios 
10 Consequently, Transener is excluded from further analysis. The corresponding market indices used to compute 
beta are Dow Jones Industrial (US), Euro Stoxx 50 (Europe), S&P/ASX 200 (Australia) and the FTSE All 
World Index. Financial data were extracted from Reuters. 10 years of monthly returns from July 2000 until 
June 2010 are represented in the analysis. As some of the companies were not listed in 2000, the starting 
portfolios in 2000 represent only two stocks for the Australian and two stocks for the European portfolio. 
Enagas and Snam Rete gas are added to the European portfolio beginning 2001. The risk free interest rate is 
calculated based on one-month T-Bill (US), Euribor one-month (Europe) and Federal Reserve Bank accepted 
bills 30 days (Australia). A fictive World risk free rate is computed with weighting US, Europe and Australia 
data with market capitalizations. 
11 In the classic Fama and French (1997) paper, SMB is derived separating NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ assets 
in 6 portfolios considering size (small or big) and book-to-market (low, medium, high). SMB is the calculated 
as difference between the average of the big and small portfolios. The Index-based approach used in this paper 
is pragmatic, as the building of the portfolios and the value updating is handled by a financial intermediary. 
The results of both approaches (Index-based, portfolio-based) were tested with the US-data set and found to 
provide similar results. The missing years in the data set of Kenneth E. French (2008-2010 for Europe and 
Australia) were completed with US data.  
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Table 7: TFM factors 
Portfolio  βe  t-stat  se  t-stat  he  t-stat  R
2 
Australia - NetOp  0.45  5.5
***  0.12  1.8
*  -0.02  -0.3  0.20 
Australia - Integr  0.76  7.5
***  0.62  7.5
***  -0.29  -2.6
**  0.42 
Europe - NetOp  0.32  5.4
***  0.14  2.3
**  -0.04  -0.5  0.23 
Europe - Integr  0.52  5.6
***  0.09  0.9  0.40  2.9
***  0.32 
US - NetOp  0.30  4.4
***  0.34  4.0
***  0.04  0.6  0.30 
US - Integr  0.73  5.9
***  -0.09  -0.6  0.25  2.2
**  0.27 
World - NetOp  0.27  5.9
***  0.18  2.1
**  0.12  1.8
*  0.37 
*** significant at 99%, 
** at 95% and 
* at 90% 
 
Market return is the most statistically significant factor. Interestingly, HML is more relevant 
for integrated companies (higher sensitivities, higher t-statistics) than for network operators 
while the effect is the exact opposite regarding SMB. For six out of the seven time series 
analyzed, only one additional factor is significant (at a 95% level), while only for the World 
series for network operators all factors are found to be relevant. This signifies clearly that the 
use of additional factors improves the explanatory power of the model capturing also more 
variance.  The sensitivity to SMB is positive for network operators which is in line with 
expectations but contrasts  the results of Fama and French (1997) who found negative 
sensitivities for the utilities industry. The results for the portfolio ‘US-Integr‘ are in line with 
FF, but the SMB factor is not significant. Another interesting result is the negative sign of hi 
for ‘Australia-Integr’ which is significant. In the classic FF-paper, negative signs for hi are 
found among others for the sectors ‘drugs’, ‘medical equipment’, ‘electronic equipment’ and 
‘retail’. A negative sensitivity may be interpreted that assets of these sectors may serve as 
hedge if the risk premium for being a value stock increases. 
Results for the CRR-APT 
The third part of the analysis consists of the computation of an APT. There are two basic 
approaches  for  constructing  APT-models,  explanatory  factor analysis (directly leading to 
factors and factor loadings, but without theoretical background about the nature of the factors) 
and the pre-specification of factors, followed by the computation of the factor loadings. The 
second approach is used here, as from a practitioner’s point of view it is more intuitive to 
have an explicit understanding of the factors influencing the required return on equity. Based 
on the evidence presented in Chen, Ross and Roll (1986), a seminal paper in arbitrage pricing 




Table 8: APT factors 
Risk  Significance  Measurement  Data source 
Interest rate  Time preference  UTS(t) = Return (10 y gov. bond, t)  
- Return (1 month treasury bill, t-1)  
US Federal Reserve, ECB, 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
Confidence  Higher yields signify 
increasing risk aversion 
URP(t) = Return (10 y gov. bond, t)  
- Return (BAA-securities Moody’s, t)  
US Federal Reserve 
Unexpected 
inflation 
Impact depending on 
business  
US: UI(t) = CPI(t)/CPI(t-1) - Expected inflation (t) 
Australia: No monthly inflation data available 
Europe: No expectations available 
FED of Minneapolis, University of 
Michigan Inflation Expectation 
Business 
cycle 
Impact depending on 
business 
MP(t) = Growth rate of industrial production vs. last 
month (t) 
OECD monthly production data 
Market 
timing 
Effects not captured by the 
macroeconomic factors 
MI(t) = Residual of indices used previously, part that 
is not explained by the four factors presented 
Dow Jones, Euro Stoxx, ASX/S&P 
 
The sensitivities of network operators asset returns to the macroeconomic factors are 
identified using a multiple linear regression. This part is indispensable for the analysis, as the 
                                                 
12 The CRR factors were used in an important number of other papers such as Bower et al. (1984), Burmeister 
and Wall (1986), Berry et al. (1988), Hamao (1988), Burmeister et al. (2003), Kaneko and Lee (1995) and 
Rjoub et al. (2009). A slight adaptation of the model, presented in Burmeister et al. (2003) was used. 
Consequently, market return is included as to capture all effects not accounted for by the other factors.   
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influence of the factors and their significance are the baseline for comparison to the other 
models. 
 
Table 9: APT results 
Portfolio  βUTS  t-statUTS  βURP  t-statURP  βUI  t-statUI  βMP  t-statMP  βMI  t-statMI  R
2 
Australia - NetOp  0.46  1.25  -0.10  -0.31      0.74  1.31  0.36  4.53
*  0.19 
Australia - Integr  0.15  0.28  -1.35  -2.82
*      0.57  0.69  0.44  3.82
*  0.20 
Europe - NetOp  0.59  2.15
**  -1.16  -2.88
*      -0.18  -0.66  0.27  4.59
*  0.24 
Europe - Integr  0.60  1.35  -1.35  -2.05
**      0.53  1.18  0.51  5.20
*  0.27 
US - NetOp  0.21  1.06  -0.74  -2.29
**  -0.06  -0.09  -0.59  -1.59  0.35  4.88
*  0.21 
US - Integr  0.11  0.34  -1.32  -2.41
**  -0.33  -0.28  0.19  0.30  0.69  5.59
*  0.27 
World - NetOp  0.23  1.30  -0.85  -3.92
*      0.00  -0.01  0.28  6.13
*  0.32 
*** significant at 99%, 
** at 95% and 
* at 90% 
 
The explanatory power is in line with Berry et al. (1988) or Elton et al. (1994) who both find 
that the macroeconomic variables explain roughly one quarter of the indices’ variation. Aside 
from market timing risk, the default risk premium is a significant factor in all portfolios (with 
the exception of Australian network operators). Betas for the risk premium URP are negative 
indicating that in the case of more risk averse investors, utilities will profit by lower required 
equity returns. Unexpected inflation (in the US) and monthly production have no significant 
explanatory power. 
Comparison of the Quality of the Models 
An overview of the results obtained is presented in Table 10Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte 
nicht gefunden werden.. TFM mostly leads to a considerably higher R
2 than the CAPM. 
APT is in most cases superior to the CAPM but only once has a slightly higher R
2 than the 
TFM. This may be due to the fact that the pre-specified factors do not work very well, either 
because they do not capture additional risks or due to measurement issues. An alternative 
might be to use factor analysis to generate factors that do not have an obvious economic 
interpretation. But given  the reality of regulatory hearings it appears to be difficult to 
implement this methodology. The aim of this section has been to show whether alternatives to 
the CAPM may work well in the context of setting the cost of capital for a network operators. 
The TFM does well, the APT rather not.  
 





   Number of significant factors 
 
      90%      95%      99%     
  CAPM  TFM  APT  CAPM  TFM  APT  CAPM  TFM  APT  CAPM  TFM  APT 
Australia - NetOp  0.19  0.20  0.19  1  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Australia - Integr  0.14  0.42  0.20  1  3  2  1  3  2  1  2  3 
Europe - NetOp  0.18  0.23  0.24  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  1  2 
Europe - Integr  0.24  0.32  0.27  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  1 
US - NetOp  0.19  0.30  0.21  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  1 
US - Integr  0.25  0.27  0.27  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  1  1 
World - NetOp  0.32  0.37  0.32  1  3  2  1  2  2  1  1  2 
 
But one has to bear in mind that the use of additional factors leads to additional sources of 
uncertainty in the equation, namely the stability of betas and the level of risk premium. Beta 
stability is always a problem, if the considered time period is relatively short. Therefore, the 
10-year period was separated in five 2-year periods and the TFM-calculations were 
reproduced. We found that stability of se (measured by the standard deviation of the five 
periods, normalized by its mean) was comparable to βe  for European and US network 
operators and Australian vertically integrated utilities. The stability of se was comparable to βe 
US integrated utilities. A regulator might thus use these comparably stable sensitivities if the 
according risk premiums are robust. Therefore, in the following section, risk premiums are 
derived using the alternative model specifications.   
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Estimation of Risk Premiums 
The estimation of risk premiums for each model is based on two major inputs, the sensitivities 
computed and the risk premiums for each factor. Dimson et al. (2003) present market risk 
premiums over a time span from 1900 until 2002. Two facts stand out: The high standard 
deviations (generally  larger than 15%) and the difference of results obtained when  using 
geometric as compared to arithmetic means (at least 1.3%, sometimes up to 5.5%). With 
regard to the Fama and French factors, SMB and HML were computed based on a time span 
from 1925 until 2009 based on the French (2010) data, the uncertainty being comparable.   
 
Table 11: TFM factor premiums 
Portfolio  re-rf  SMB  HML 
Geometric mean  5.9%  2.9%  3.3% 
Arithmetic mean  8.1%  3.8%  4.4% 
Standard deviation  20.8%  14.3%  14.3% 
 
The subject of risk premiums is even vaguer when one gathers APT values. Table  11 
summarizes average risk premiums published in different research papers. The important 
differences between results are obvious, not only regarding the level of risk prices but even 
their signs, sometimes being positive, sometimes negative.
13
 
 The problem becomes obvious 
comparing the results of Chen et al. (1986) with Shanken and Weinstein (2006), which are 
computed using the same data set but slightly different methodologies regarding portfolio 
constructing rules. A regulation authority or the management of a network operator will be 
confronted with an unsolvable task of setting the adequate risk premium. An own analysis 
using the two-stage approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) was conducted with data from all 
companies listed in Dow Jones Industrial Average, Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P/ASX 50. With 
data for the period 2000-2010, no significant results could be computed. 
Table 12: APT risk factor prices 
Author  Data  UTS  URP  UI  MP  MI 
Chen et al. (1986)  1958-1984  -6.6%  9.5%  -0.9%  16.0%  4.5% 
Berry et al. (1988)  1972-1982  12.0%  5.3%  -0.5%  1.8%  6.1% 
Elton et al. (1994)  1978-1990  5.8%  4.6%  -1.0%  3.8%  4.6% 
Kaneko and Lee (1995)  1975-1993  3.3%  0.5%    -1.5%  8.3% 
Burmeister et al. (2003)  Not indicated  -0.7%  2.6%  -4.3%  1.5%  3.6% 
Shanken and Weinstein (2006)  1958-1984    14.3%  -1.2%  2.8%  1.1% 
Sources: Chen et al. (1986), means table 4. Kaneko and Lee (1995), table 1. Inflation results are not presented here due to different definition 
with mean value different from zero. Shanken and Weinstein (2006), table 1, unrestricted values with n=20 and five-year prior betas. 
 
To compute some exemplary results, the values published in Burmeister et al. (2003) are used. 
These values have been notably reproduced  and popularized through textbooks such as 
Brealey et al. (2007), Pratt and Grabowski (2008) and Elton et al. (2009). Thereby, mean 
values are considered in calculating risk premiums. The results of risk premiums calculated 
with CAPM, TFM and APT are summarized in Table 13. 
 
                                                 
13 This phenomenon appeared for instance in Elton et al. (1994, pp. 56) where the premiums change by factor 10 
within 4 years. Another example is Chen et al. (1986, pp. 396) with UTS changing by a factor of about 30 from 
one 10 years period to another. Poon and Taylor (1991) indicate some problems in their work with APT, 
sometimes factors are priced, other times not. Martikainen et al. (1991) summarize in an application to Finnish 
data that it is difficult to find any stable economic interpretation from the pre-specified macro-economic 
factors.   
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Consistent with literature, important differences in valuation are visible. The negative risk 
premium in the APT models is mostly due to an important sensitivity of all portfolios towards 
URP. This means that required equity return for network operators decreases if the default 
risk premium increases. Interestingly, the effect is solely due to the development of the risky 
bonds, the development of the long term  government bond being insignificant.  The 
sensitivities to URP are not abnormal, Berry et al. (1996) reporting similar values for the 
utility industry. To get a better understanding of this relationship, more long term data is 
required.  
Summarizing, additional factors improve results. From a regulation authority’s point of view, 
the use of a TFM does not add much complexity to the process of estimation of cost of capital 
and is especially useful due to the significance and the robustness of SMB. The use of APT is 
more complex, as one has to either overcome difficulties in the setting of risk prices or rely on 
the factor analysis approach, which will be difficult to explain to the stakeholders of 
regulation. The problem of risk prices is less severe for TFM as published long term data (at 
least for the US) is available and risk prices are much less volatile over time. 
4  A Simplified Two-Factor-Model with SMB for Non-listed Firms 
The results of the previous section suggest the additional use of SMB in setting the equity 
returns for regulated network operators. The identification of se is based on a portfolio of 
network operators which may be much bigger than the firms the regulator is setting the equity 
returns for. A regulator could thus identify required equity return based on the following two-
factor-model excluding HML. The question arises if a portfolio of smaller network operators 
would be characterized by different values of se. If this is the case, the regulator might opt for 
a choice to set higher levels of se and thus attribute an additional size premium that smaller 
operators require to have a sustainable equity return. To analyze, if an important correlation 
between se and network size le (measured in km of cables, overhead lines, pipelines and tubes) 
exists, the following relationship has to be significant. 
ε + ⋅ + = e e l b a s                   ( 1 ) 
If ltarget corresponds to the target size, the regulation authority wishes to set equity returns for, 
and  e l  represents the average network size, then the following equation for the required 
equity returns results. 
  ( ) ( )SMB l l b SMB s r r a r r e e f m e f e target − + + − + = − β           ( 2 ) 
To identify  b,  three cross sectional regressions have been conducted based on the model 
described above. As expected, network size le and the sensitivity to SMB se are negatively 
correlated. R
2 values are at a reasonable level at least for the 10-years perspective. The effect 
is relatively weak indicating that SMB impact is due to the business activity. 
 







Portfolio  CAPM  TFM  APT (Burm.)  APT (means) 
Australia - NetOp  2.7%  3.3%  3.0%  6.4% 
Australia - Integr  3.5%  6.0%  0.2%  -2.2% 
Europe - NetOp  1.2%  1.6%  -2.6%  -5.5% 
Europe - Integr  2.4%  3.7%  -1.1%  -2.3% 
US - NetOp  2.1%  2.7%  -0.8%  -4.8% 
US - Integr  4.0%  4.4%  1.8%  -2.8% 
World - NetOp  1.5%  2.1%  -1.2%  -3.5% 
Period length  α  t-statistic  β  t-statistic  R2 
 1 year  0.3784  3.3
***  -0.0006  -0.5  0.02 
5 years  0.2388  4.4
***  -0.0008  -1.1  0.06 
10 years  0.2879  5.0
***  -0.0010  -1.8
*  0.14 
*** significant at 99%, 
** at 95% and 
* at 90%  
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The average network operator in our sample is characterized by a network length  e l  of about 
65,000 km and an average  e s  of 0.18. For every 10,000 km of regulatory target size less, se 
increases by 0.01. Having calculated the average risk premium for SMB at a level of 0.6%, if 
the regulator chose a target size of 5,000 km than an additional size premium of 0.2% would 
result, the total SMB risk premium being 0.8%. This approach shows that the SMB concept 
can easily be applied to network operators, even if the regulated network operators are 
significantly smaller than the firms used to evaluate the regulatory parameters. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper has been meant to give a qualitative and quantitative overview of the cost of equity 
capital for utilities companies with the focus of network operators. The existing literature 
indicates that there are significant differences in the valuation of the required equity return. 
The main drivers of these differences are the valuation model, leverage, the position in the 
value chain and firm size. Some further factors such as the nature of regulation (cost of 
service, incentive regulation), the branch (electricity, gas) do not turn out to have important 
impacts. Regulatory events surely influence betas and consequently required equity returns 
but it depends majorly on the type of these events, if the changes are long-lasting. 
Recent approaches of 21 regulation authorities have been thoroughly analyzed to see whether 
the regulators act according to the results presented in section 2. The results are surprising. 
None of the regulation authorities, except OFGEM that had additional support by a DGM, 
uses alternative valuation models to have a second approach besides the CAPM. Many of the 
regulation authorities include integrated utilities  companies in their sample (which is not 
recommended due to rather  different business risks) but differentiate electricity and gas 
(which is not necessary according to the results provided). Only the regulation authority in 
Kosovo considers a firm size effect, but without theoretical link to the SMB concept. 
With a data set of 20 network operators, CAPM, FF-TFM and CCR-APT models have been 
built in order to compute required equity returns.  If these models would all lead to 
approximately the same results with a comparable regression quality, then the approach to use 
solely the CAPM might be appropriate. Yet both multi factor models are found to have more 
explanatory power than the single factor CAPM, unfortunately at a certain price. The use of 
more factors leads to a reduction of intuitiveness, stability issues  and  requires  additional 
assumptions about risk premiums, which could be contested by regulated companies. As for 
the sensitivities of network operators to additional risks beside market risk, the default risk 
premium SMB has a very high significance with regard to network operators. Consequently, a 
consideration in asset pricing seems appropriate and would result in additional equity returns 
between 0.4 and 0.6%.  
As for the use of the default risk premium, more research is necessary to compute long term 
estimates of the risk premium. The incorporation of the size effect in the computation of the 
required equity return is straightforward. An intuitive approach has been developed how to 
determine  SMB-based size premiums for regulated network operators that differ in size 
significantly from the firms used to take into account the sensitivity to the size premium 
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